TRENDS AND ISSUES IN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
MIRIAM F. MIQUELON-WEISMANN*
Scientific “truths” provide the underpinnings of
forensic science. Generally, scientific fact is proven based
upon accepted scientific method in the particular field. Legal
“truths” sometimes depend upon scientific truth to prove or
disprove a fact in issue but legal truths are not established
merely by the exercise of scientific method. Legal truths
derive from the processes of the adversary system. The legal
selection criteria utilized in picking and choosing what is and
is not legitimate forensic proof in the eyes of the law rests on
the rules of evidence and established case precedent. As
technology advances and the interdisciplinary fields of study
expand to redefine the boundaries of scientific truth, the law
must continually re-evaluate those techniques accepted as
reliable and others cast aside under the rubric of “junk
science.” In this process, scientific truth is subordinated to
legal truth.1
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Legal educators increasingly use the classroom to
import expertise from scientists and social scientists to better
prepare law students to engage in specialized and
collaborative fields of practice.2 Indeed, this project grew out
of a paper course on Scientific Evidence in Civil and
Criminal Cases offered during the spring 2006 semester at the
law school. Students heard from accident reconstruction
experts, DNA scientists, forensic pathologists and medical
malpractice experts. In February 2006, Dr. Aaron Lazare,
Dean and Chancellor at the University of Massachusetts,
addressed the law school on a cutting-edge legal theory from
his recently published book, “On Apology.”3 Stimulated by
this flow of information from scientists and social scientists,
the journal staff invited articles from various scientific and
non-scientific disciplines in an effort to identify new forensic
theories and consider their relevance and possible application
to the law.4
The boundaries of the law in terms of the
admissibility of expert opinion testimony are fixed, however,
those boundaries remain as uncertain in application as the
underlying principles of science and technology that inform a
court’s decisions. The hallmark of admissibility of expert
witness testimony, under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,5 requires that the opinion be the “product of
reliable principles and methods.” Rule 702 was subsequently
amended in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
2
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5
FED.R.EVID.702:Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 6 and to the
many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael. 7 In Daubert, the Supreme Court charged trial
judges with the responsibility of acting as Agatekeepers@ to
exclude unreliable scientific testimony, and later, in Kumho
Tire, the Supreme Court expanded the application of the
Agatekeeper function@ to non-scientific expert testimony.
Daubert provides a non-exclusive checklist for trial
courts to use in assessing the reliability of scientific expert
testimony: (1) whether the expert=s technique or theory can
be or has been tested B that is, whether the expert=s theory
can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is
instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the
technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community. Consistent with this opinion, the Court
applied the same factors in Kumho Tire to assess the
reliability of non-scientific expert testimony, depending upon
Athe particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.@8
While the relevant factors for determining reliability
will vary according to each particular field of expertise, the
rules of evidence reject the premise that an expert=s
testimony should be treated more permissively simply
because it is outside the realm of science.9 An opinion from
an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same
degree of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert
who purports to be a scientist. Some types of expert
testimony will be more objectively verifiable, and subject to
the expectations of falsifiability, peer review, and publication,
6
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than others. Some types of expert testimony will not rely on
anything like a scientific method, and so will have to be
evaluated by reference to other standard principles attendant
to the particular area of expertise.
With these legal standards and limitations in mind, the
reader should consider whether the theories presented by the
authors in this journal satisfy the current evidentiary
standards governing admissibility. The challenge of applying
law to science and the inevitable tension between
interdisciplinary methods gives rise to an important and
vigorous dialogue…one that we hope is found to be of
interest within the pages of this journal. 10
GLENN R. SCHMITT- “AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE:
LESSONS
LEARNED
FROM
9/11:
DNA
IDENTIFICATION IN MASS FATALITY INCIDENTS”
Glenn R. Schmitt is the Deputy Director and Acting
Director of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). He was
appointed Deputy Director in 2001. Prior to joining NIJ, Mr.
Schmitt served as the Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Director
Schmitt authored a special introduction to the Report of the
National Institute of Justice for this symposium journal. In his
introduction, Schmitt emphasizes that although “Lessons
Learned From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality
Incidents,” (Report), is designed primarily to help the
Nation’s crime laboratory directors respond to future mass
fatality disasters—be they natural disasters, large
transportation accidents, or terrorist events—a variety of
issues in the Report concern the intersection of criminal
justice and forensics, particularly as it relates to using DNA
analysis to identify victims when other identification methods
are not enough. The Report is both a compelling story of the
10

The project continues. The journal staff invites articles for the 2007
journal on the topic of Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law; followed
by the 2008 journal on the topic of Trends and Issues in International
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Trends and Issues in Bankruptcy and the Family.
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recovery of human remains using DNA technology and a
guide to evidentiary issues involving the admissibility of
DNA evidence, such as chain of custody and evidence
preservation, of interest to every practitioner. However, the
Report goes beyond the more obvious evidentiary issues
connected to the use and admissibility of DNA evidence and
includes other major litigation issues attendant to the use of
DNA scientific evidence including: dealing with the press,
privacy act considerations, and the use of an advisory panel
of experts and/or bioethicists. At the same time, the Report
underscores the need for the laboratory directors to be evermindful of the potential for civil action. Such litigation could
arise out of misidentification, release of information, control
of remains, and intellectual property assertions regarding the
development of new DNA identification techniques. The
Report offers guidance regarding the need for a laboratory
director to work closely with contracting officers and
attorneys on issues such as contracts, intellectual property
rights, and privacy issues, including the creation of a next-ofkin release policy. Director Schmitt provides an excellent
summary of the legal issues attendant to the courtroom use of
DNA evidence and the less obvious but equally significant
risks of litigation attendant to the collection, dissemination
and use of this scientific evidence.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE-“LESSONS
LEARNED FROM 911: DNA IDENTIFICATION IN MASS
FATALITY INCIDENTS”11
On the 5th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, the National Institute of Justice—the
research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S.
Department of Justice—published a major report on the
11

This article has been adapted and reprinted from the September 2006
NIJ Report entitled: “LESSONS LEARNED FROM 911: DNA
IDENTIFICATION IN MASS FATALITY INCIDENTS” with
permission from the United States Department of Justice and the National
Institute of Justice.
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identification of mass disaster victims using DNA analysis.
The Report is prepared by the Kinship and Data Analysis
Panel, a multidisciplinary group of scientists assembled by
the National Institute of Justice to offer guidance to the New
York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in the
identification of those who perished in the World Trade
Center. The Southern New England School of Law is
privileged to offer this excellent work to its readers and the
legal and scientific community.
SUSAN LECLAIR AND JAMES GRIFFITH-“DNA IN THE
COURTROOM”
Dr. Susan Leclair is a professor of Medical
Laboratory Science at the University of Massachusetts at
Dartmouth. Dr. James Griffith is the Chancellor Professor
and Chairman of the Medical Laboratory Science Department
at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth. Dr. Griffith
is also executive director of the University of Massachusetts
Center for Molecular Diagnostics. He is also an adjunct
professor at the Southern New England School of Law and
participated as a guest lecturer in the course offered on
Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases at the law
school.
The Leclair and Griffith article serves as the perfect
accompaniment to the NIJ Report. Here, two renowned
scientists in the field explain the science behind the scientific
evidence of DNA. The article is a must for any practitioner.
In order to introduce scientific evidence, a lawyer must
understand the language and method of the science. In that
way, the practitioner can act as an intermediary between the
expert witness and the jury in the presentation of the
scientific evidence to aid in the resolution of a matter in issue
at trial. In the same way, an attorney can only test the
reliability of the scientific method by first understanding the
scientific principles that form the basis of the proposed expert
opinion.
Leclair and Griffith deftly navigate the non-scientist
through the scientific waters of DNA technology, defining its
uses, limitations and reliability in the courtroom setting.
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Specifically, the article explores the history and development
of DNA. Leclair and Griffith then explain the basic structure
of DNA, methods of inheritance, and the bridges to
technology or forms of testing. The testing methods
discussed include: DNA probe technology, PCR technology,
and Immunoassay. Testing principles are examined in detail,
including quantification and analysis. The article then
connects the testing process to forensic application. After a
cogent explanation of the forensic uses, Leclair and Griffith
explore the uses of the forensic evidence in a courtroom and
consider the differences between reliable DNA evidence and
the stuff that defines “junk science.”
Finally, “professionalism” and the use experts are
considered in the context of evidence presentation at trial.
These scientists conclude that the future use of DNA to serve
the interests of justice turns on its subservience to the legal
system that dictates the contours of the admissibility of this
unique scientific evidence.
NASEAM RACHEL BEHOUZFARD-“STRENGTHS,
LIMITATIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES OF DNA
EVIDENCE”
Naseam Behouzfard is a student at the Southern New
England School of Law and a member of the law review
staff. In her article, Behouzfard examines the historical and
legal development of the use of DNA evidence in the
courtroom. There is particular emphasis on the legal tests
developed by the courts in ruling on its admissibility at trial
and the evidentiary pitfalls that can preclude admissibility,
including chain of custody issues and other possible
contamination problems. Like the preceding NIJ report, the
article concludes that use of DNA technology as scientific
evidence is critical to the investigative and judicial fact
finding processes, particularly in criminal cases where proof
of innocence can, in some cases, be conclusively established
through testing.
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MATTHEW KOES-“SHELLFISH CONTAMINATION:
REDUCING THE NECESSITY FOR SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES
NDER THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT”
Matthew Koes is an attorney and recent graduate of
the Southern New England School of Law. In his article,
Koes examines the problems of using scientific evidence in
quantifying future damages to shellfish resources caused by
pollution contamination to the fragile coastal eco-systems.
Koes examines the benefits of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) over traditional common law remedies as the
vehicle for compensating the public for damages to natural
resources caused by industrial contamination.
However, a problem arises under CERCLA because
the ultimate manifestations of hazardous waste pollution are
unpredictable and long term and the extent of these damages
cannot be accurately quantified until long after the legal
dispute is resolved in the courts. Because of the speculative
nature of the scientific evidence as a predictor of future harm,
the reliability of its use is frequently called into question.
The legal conundrum is how to use scientific evidence to
prove the unpredictable future harms occasioned by industrial
pollution. The problem is significant because unknown but
anticipated future harm, surfacing long after the lawsuit is
over, may result in an unfair economic burden to the public
whereas the economic burden should be borne by the
polluter.
The author argues that the evidentiary requirements
under CERCLA for establishing causation between actual
known damage and future unknown but anticipated harm
should be relaxed to ease proof standards consistent with the
quasi-strict liability standards imposed by Congress on
certain industries responsible for industrial contamination and
remediation. To this end, Koes examines the nature of
scientific evidence and the use of expert testimony in
CERCLA litigation. He carefully considers the limitations of
the federal rules of evidence in light of the decisions in
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Daubert and Kumho Tire, concluding that some courts have
recognized that environmental litigation requires a special
application of the rules of evidence to compensate for the
unpredictable nature of the certain harm caused by industrial
polluters. Koes then applies that consideration to the
CERCLA legislative framework.
Koes offers a template for utilizing scientific evidence
to establish a prima facie case under CERCLA. He explains
the use of “fingerprinting” sources of pollution and
contamination over time in a particular coastal region and
then using the fingerprint as a predictor for future damages.
Koes demonstrates the reticence of some courts to accept the
proof while others show a greater willingness to accept the
reliability of this scientific evidence.
Koes underscores the case law finding that calculating
damages may be an abstract exercise to some degree but the
value of the nation’s natural resources are also not “fully
captured by the market system.” Koes thus concludes by
acknowledging the “awkward partnership” between law and
science in the area of CERCLA litigation and the need to
replace the current causation standard with a more workable
proof standard tied to strict liability.
MATTHEW PILLSBURY-“SAY SORRY AND SAVE: A
PRACTICAL ARGUMENT FOR A GREATER ROLE FOR
APOLOGIES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW”
-WITH A FOREWARD BY ROBERT WARD
Matthew Pillsbury is an attorney and recent graduate
and valedictorian (2006) of the Southern New England
School of Law. Prior to seeking his law degree, he worked as
a journalist and writer. In his article, Pillsbury considers more
than just the restorative effects of an apology by the
wrongdoer to the victim in a medical malpractice action. He
considers the empirical proof which supports the claim that
an apology reduces the incidence of litigation and/or the size
and amount of damages awards. The particular evidentiary
problem examined in the article arises out of the inability to
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use apology as a means to mitigate damages where the
statement can later be used as a damaging admission against
interest in subsequent litigation.
Pillsbury examines the novel theory of using apology
as a means to reduce litigation and damages awards set forth
in Dr. Aaron Lazare’s recent book, “On Apology.” The
skeptic might be surprised to learn from Pillsbury’s article
that several state legislatures have agreed with the theory and,
to implement its use, enacted legislation to exclude from
evidence at trial the use of an apology as a damaging
admission of liability. Roughly twenty nine states have
“apology laws” that protect expressions of sympathy or
sorrow from being used as evidence against the apologizer. In
fact, Massachusetts was the first state in the nation to enact an
apology protection law. Likewise, several court opinions also
recognize the importance of apology in the field of medical
malpractice and exclude its use at trial as an admission
against interest by a party opponent.
Pillsbury concludes that the introduction of apology
as a legal tool has the power to revolutionize medical
malpractice law. Robert Ward, Dean at the Southern New
England School of Law, agrees and in his “Foreword” to the
article advocates the use of apology as a means to achieving
damages reform in the hotly debated political arena of
litigation caps on damages. The practitioner is presented with
scientific empirical proof supporting this trend in the law.
DENNIS RODERICK AND SUSAN KRUMHOLZ-“MUCH
ADO ABOUT NOTHING? A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE”
Dr. Dennis Roderick is a Lecturer in Psychology and
Crime and Justice Studies at the University of Massachusetts
at Dartmouth. He is also a Lecturer in Psychology at Curry
College. Dr. Susan Krumholz is an Associate Professor in
the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the
Director of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of
Massachusetts at Dartmouth. She also served as legal counsel
for the Office of Human Rights in the Massachusetts
Department of Mental Health. In their article, Roderick and
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Krumholz argue that therapeutic jurisprudence, (TJ),
originally conceived as a legal tool in the field of civil
commitment and mental health law, offers an alternative
means to aid in the mediation of litigation disputes in the
criminal justice system. At least one goal of therapeutic
remediation is a decrease in the rate of recidivism.
Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes that legal rules,
procedures and actors are social forces that intentionally or
unintentionally produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic
consequences in the judicial process. The authors contend
that the theoretical principles of TJ have been utilized by
legal scholars, judges, practitioners, social scientists and even
lawmakers, in the field of criminal justice. It has been
employed as a successful “problem-solving technique” or
healing process designed to mitigate the psychological and
social harms arising out of the operation of the criminal
justice system to both the victim and the perpetrator.
Specifically, the authors explore how TJ provides a study or
explanation of how legal processes, laws and legal actors can
have a therapeutic effect or non-therapeutic effect in the
criminal justice system.
Roderick and Krumholz explore the debate between
social scientists as to an accurate definition of TJ. Then, the
authors embark upon the study of the validity (accuracy) and
reliability (consistency) of its theoretical constructs in direct
application to the criminal justice system. TJ is a social
sciences theory. It is a perspective that examines whether the
criminal justice system has failed the participants by merely
serving as a vehicle to mete out punishment and vindicate the
interests of society at large without truly accounting for the
harm or damage suffered by the victims and the perpetrators
or the roles of other relevant actors, including judges and
lawyers, in that process.
At least one goal of TJ is to reduce recidivism through
some form of systematic therapeutic method. Like any
scientific method, whether aimed at evidentiary admissibility
or achieving some verifiable result in the criminal justice
system, it should be subject to empirical verification.
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However, the authors conclude that major structural reform in
the criminal justice system is required before any significant
empirical results could be obtained.
The legal system seldom looks at itself critically and
the viewpoints of social scientists contribute to that
examination process. Roderick and Krumholz offer a
theoretical but nonetheless important first step to considering
new options to the current methodology of prosecution and
sentencing. With increased rates of recidivism, the debate is
certainly
worth
considering.
Whether
therapeutic
jurisprudence offers a scientific method capable of empirical
verification or reliability remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
What is justice without truth? What would the law be
without forensic science? The articles published in this
volume provide some insight into these perplexing questions.
That glimmer of wisdom is the goal of this project. The
authors and editors welcome your comments and feedback.
The Roundtable Symposium Law Journal is proud to dedicate
this volume to the Southern New England School of Law in
honor of its 25th year celebration.

